Thesis Information
Title: Circumventing Lower Bounds in Mechanism Design
Adviser: S. Matthew Weinberg
Institution: Princeton University
Graduation Date: July 2020
Contact Information
Email Candidate
Candidate Website
SIGACT Membership No.: 0644007
Candidate Bio:
Ariel Schvartzman Cohenca is a PhD candidate at Princeton University advised by S. Matthew Weinberg. Ariel's work focuses in understanding the trade-off between optimality and simplicity in the design of multi-dimensional auctions. He was awarded the Department of Computer Science's Graduate Student Teaching Award in 2017, and the School of Engineering and Applied Science's Award for Excellence in 2018. During the summer of 2018, Ariel was a research intern at Google-Mountain View. He obtained his B.S. in Mathematics with Computer Science from MIT in 2015.
Paper 1:
Approximation Schemes for a Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries. Pravesh Kothari, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman, Sahil Singla, S. Matthew Weinberg. FOCS 2019.
Link to PDFPaper 2:
Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values. Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg. EC 2019.
Link to PDFPaper 3:
The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design. Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg. SODA 2018.
Link to PDFKeywords: economics and computation, algorithmic game theory